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New York, New York
It is time to quit pretending that supply management works as a farm
income enhancement program. It may in the short run; it doesn't in the
long run.
It is time to stop pretending that protectionist trade policies help America's
agriculture. They may in the short run; they don't in the long run.
While a combination of rigid farm production controls and restrictive trade
protection is advocated by some in Washington, it is absolutely the worst
agricultural policy combination for U.S. farmers. In a fast changing world
the long run arrives quickly!
America will reach its full agricultural potential only through marketoriented farm policies and freer world trade. The Administration's 1990
Farm Bill proposals and trade reform recommendations in the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) will
continue to move us in this direction.
FARM POLICY

In an era when capital can be shifted instantaneously to any nation offering
opportunity, when technology can be transferred freely, and when farmers
around the world are increasingly competitive, it is foolish to think that
throttling back America's agricultural productivity somehow benefits
American farmers. It doesn't.
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Economic isolation, no matter how you disguise it, doesn't work. Creating
our own Berlin wall around U.S. agriculture would be foolish. United
States farm policy isn't formulated in an international vacuum, and it's a
mistake to pretend that it is. U.S. price support and acreage restriction
programs influence American farmers' production decisions, but they also
have an impact on the planting decisions of competing farmers in other
countries.

o

Higher U.S. set-asides increase our per unit cost of
production, thereby impairing our international
competitiveness;

o

Foreign producers take advantage of our supply management
programs to expand their own agricultural production and
capture market share;

o

Market share, once lost, is difficult and expensive to regain.

Over the years, our supply management attempts have (to our chagrin!)
done a great deal to stimulate increased farm production in competitor
nations. Whenever we restrict crop acreage to cut production, or use high
price supports to move commodities into government storage rather than
the marketplace, farmers in other countries inevitably take up the slack.
During the 1980's, for example, U.S. farm programs encouraged farmers to
plant corn instead of soybeans, even though the world marketplace
continued to signal for more beans. Latin American farmers
enthusiastically moved to expand oilseed production to meet the unfilled
demand. Latin American oilseed output rose from 24.1 million metric tons
per year in 1980 to 40.5 million metric tons in 1989.
Those additional 16.4 million tons of Latin American oilseeds now
compete directly each year with the output of about 20 million acres of
U.S. soybeans, competition that didn't exist in 1980. This is competition
that we generated by our own folly.
Unfortunately that's not the only example. Over the last five years, while
the U.S. set aside an average of 58 million acres per year, many of our
competitors increased their acreage, their production intensity, or both.
For 20 years, as the United States spent billions of dollars attempting to
throttle back farm production, the European Community has transformed
itself from a grain importer that purchased about 28.1 million metric tons
of wheat and coarse grains per year, to a grain exporter, exporting about
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32.3 million metric tons of wheat and coarse grains per year. Those
exports now compete directly with American farm products in the world
marketplace.
Western Europe's increased productive capacity now cancels out the annual
supply management effects of about 31 million acres of U.S. set-aside land.
We pulled back on production while the Europeans and Latin Americans
forged ahead. We gave them market share -- invaluable market share -- on
a silver platter, with hardly a whimper of protest.
What goes on here! Does this sound like a winning scenario for the
American farmer? Of course not.
It is little wonder a number of our world trading partners have been

reluctant to rush into GAIT policy reforms in agriculture. Why promote
change if the United States is willing to unilaterally pare back crop
production each time it appears world commodity supplies might become
burdensome.
World wheat prices drop, and the U.S. activates government programs that
encourage U.S. farmers to hold wheat off the market. Corn prices tumble,
and the U.S. government adjusts commodity programs to make it more
lucrative for farmers to take land out of production rather than plant com.
The U.S. has even been willing to store the bulk of any excess commodities
for the rest of the world. Even more amazing we have been willing to take
all these steps, regardless of the internal farm subsidy programs of
competing nations, regardless of their export subsidy programs, and
regardless of their restrictive import policies! Have we shot ourselves in
the foot? You bet -- over and over again. Yet some Members of Congress
wish to repeat the experience, one more time, in the 1990 Farm Bill. And
some are fretting over the GAIT negotiations which are trying to tackle
the unfair practices of our competitors head on.
This has to stop! We've had enough agricultural masochism, and enough
of giving away export sales and the earnings they would have generated.
Supply management in agriculture fails wretchedly in a globalized
economy. The theory supporting supply management in the past was
centered on the idea that the earth's farming resources were limited, and
that the U.S. was one of a limited number of places where agricultural
crops could be efficiently produced. Therefore, we could establish farm
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policies on our own, and not worry about the reaction of producers
elsewhere. Modern farming technology, economic development, and
scientific education have turned that idea on its head. More and more
nations continue to increase their agricultural productivity and efficiency.
While the U.S. currently enjoys a competitive edge in many segments of
agricultural production, it is an advantage that can't be taken for granted.
Our own government policies have already shifted too much agricultural
production outside the United States.
Micro-management of agriculture by government doesn't work; it's time we
accept this lesson and move on. American farmers need open, aggressive,
trade-oriented farm policies that help strengthen their competitive position
in world markets. Farm programs that are more flexible, not less flexible;
more market-oriented, not less market-oriented!
I have great confidence in American farmers' ability to make their own
management decisions and to continue improving their production and
marketing efficiencies. That is why we have proposed additional flexibility
in the 1990 Farm Bill. This has raised anxious cries inside the Washington,
D.C. beltway, but farmers want to make their own decisions, and they merit
that privilege. Why not give them the flexibility to respond quickly to
changing world market conditions, capitalizing on marketing opportunities
as they see them. Regrettably, Congress seems determined to insist on
program rigidities that drastically under estimate the decision-making skills
of U.S. farmers.
TRADE POLICY AND THE GAIT

In trade policy, it's time to reverse 40 years of neglect in the GAIT
agricultural rules. Following World War II, the GAIT made great strides
in facilitating the flow of industrial goods between nations, knocking down
tariffs on manufactured goods in the industrialized nations from 40 percent
in the mid-1960's to a current level of 4-6 percent. But during the same
period, the nominal rate of protection on agricultural goods in industrial
nations rose from 21 percent to 40 percent.
A barrage of protective agricultural tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers has
been thrown up all around the globe during the last 40 years. All nations
have been guilty, including the United States, and now all must work
together to clean up the mess.
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The Uruguay Round offers by far the best opportunity ever to clear away
trade distortions and restrictions, and to phase out costly export subsidies
that only developed countries can afford. The Punta del Este Declaration
is the most forceful statement in favor of agricultural trade reform ever
adopted in the GATT; now we need to follow that commitment with
positive action.
Failure to reach an agricultural trade reform agreement in the GATT
would dramatically increase tensions in world agricultural trade, and would
likely trigger an escalation of restrictive trade actions and counter-actions -in short, an agricultural trade war nobody wants, and nobody wins.
What are the positive alternatives?
The United States has recommended a set of agricultural trade policy
reforms we believe to be reasonable and realistic. Let me briefly outline
those recommendations; you decide whether they are unreasonable, as our
European colleagues have suggested.
To improve import access, the United States is advocating the conversion
of all non-tariff measures, including import quotas, variable levies,
restrictive licensing and voluntary restraints, to a tariff equivalent beginning
in 1991. All tariffs would then be progressively and substantially reduced
over time, just as the GATT has done with industrial tariffs through the
years.
In export competition, our objective is to phase out, over time, all export
subsidies and export prohibitions. This might well be the greatest
contribution that developed countries can make to developing countries in
the Uruguay Round. With limited treasuries, the developing countries can
not compete in the export subsidy game against the giant economies of the
world. It'll be a contribution to our farmers too; they can complete against
European farmers, but not European treasuries.
Turning to internal agricultural support programs, we propose developing
stronger, more effective GATT rules, the objective being to phase out the
worst of those trade distorting policies, and to discipline the others. We do
not ask that any nation give up its safety net of support systems for
farmers; we simply ask that safety nets be designed to function in a manner
that does not distort, or only minimally distorts, international trade.
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In the sanitary and phytosanitary area, we ask that the participating GATT
nations attempt over time to harmonize their varying food, animal health,
and plant health standards. This should be done on the basis of sound
scientific evidence, not politics or media hysteria; working through accepted
international scientific organizations. Harmonization of international
standards is a big job, but it can be done, and almost all nations recognize
the potential health and trade benefits of doing so.
CONCLUSION
I believe the U.S. GATT proposal is reasonable, realistic and achievable.
What seems unrealistic to me is for any nation, including the United States,
to bury itself so deeply in the swamp of government trade interference and
agricultural micro-management that it chokes off incentives to its individual
farmers and the productive efficiency of its agriculture.
Regardless of what happens in the Uruguay Round or the 1990 Farm Bill,
agricultural trade and production policies will change, in the U.S. and
elsewhere. The question is whether we will work together in the world to
constructively guide that change, or whether we will continue to add layer
after layer of counter-balancing trade barriers, export subsidies and internal
supply management schemes to agriculture, until the entire policy structure
collapses under its own weight -- as has already happened in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union.
America's economic greatness stems from our unique belief in individual
opportunity, market incentives, and performance rewards. Whether in the
final Uruguay Round negotiations, or in the 1990 Farm Bill debates, these
principles still hold. Let us honor them in action as well as in rhetoric.

